Rethinking Airpower: Learnings and Pointers from Recent Wars

Rethinking Airpower: Learnings and Pointers

from Recent Wars

Published Indian Defence Review Apr-Jun 2024

“The duty of military planners is not necessarily to get the future exactly right. Rather, it's just not to get it too terribly wrong.".

Sir Michael Howard [i]

Background

War is a complex phenomenon linked to uncertainty and unpredictable outcomes. War depends on the decisions of fallible human beings, unreliable communications, and the untested performance of people and equipment [ii]. The Ukraine-Russia war is a case in point. The Russian military outgunned and outnumbered the Ukrainian military. But the anticipated quick Russian victory proved elusive. Similarly, the Azerbaijan-Armenia war of 2020 also had a surprise in store when innovative employment of drones by Azeris subdued Armenian forces, leading to their surrender. Even as uncertainty and warfare go hand in hand, militaries have little choice but to cope with it as best as they can and prepare for the future. This may involve appreciating key trends and changes needed to ensure the military remains prepared to confront future challenges.

Future war gazing normally comprises three intertwined strands. One deals with the experiences emerging from ongoing and recent wars or military trends. Wars always drive innovation, and analysing the experiences of recent wars helps identify future trends and challenges. The second strand is about the advent of critical and emerging technologies. Research and development in technologies related to space, UAVs, cyber warfare, electronics, computing, and AI are ongoing and would impact strategies and tactics in future wars. The third strand is about geopolitics, which helps identify who we may fight, when, where, and how. Taken together, the three strands provide input on future challenges in a specific context.

Scope. This article focuses on the first strand, i.e., the military trends, analysing recent and ongoing wars. Military trends from recent wars hold immense importance in confronting future challenges. The discussion of military trends is limited to assessing experiences with respect to the employment of airpower. Airpower in this discussion includes all military components using the medium of air, irrespective of whether under the control of land, sea, or air forces.

Recent and Ongoing Wars. Three ongoing or recent wars have evoked considerable interest, pointing towards the changing character of warfare, particularly relating to certain aspects of airpower. These are the Armenia-Azerbaijan war of 2020, the ongoing wars between Ukraine-Russia and the Hamas-Israel war. These wars witnessed large-scale employment of drones, revealing their potential to influence outcomes. The Ukraine-Russia war came close to a conventional war between near-peer rivals and displayed some unusual features in the employment of airpower. In contrast, the Hamas-Israel war was between a powerful state and a non-state actor, highlighting interesting features meriting attention.

The Indian Context

No two wars are similar, let alone identical. Learnings gleaned from wars thus require to be appropriately contextualized. The learnings from recent wars need to be adapted to the Indian context. In the foreseeable future, gain or loss of territory would be the focus of wars in the Indian context. Airpower in support of the land war will therefore play a decisive role. Indian airpower enjoys certain advantages over its adversaries, and exploiting the advantages would ensure favourable outcomes. In the case of Pakistan, the advantages are in terms of quality and quantity. In China’s case, it is disadvantaged by the limitations imposed by the high altitude of Chinese airfields in Tibet and the apparent better exposure, experience, and training of Indian aviators [iii]. China is attempting to overcome the limitations by improving the airpower support infrastructure and Air Defence in Tibet, besides focusing on SSMs to attack Indian airfields and aircraft on the ground. The Indian military must therefore capitalize on the advantages of its airpower by ensuring that it is exploited to the fullest extent and supports land wars in an effective manner. The important and relevant learnings are discussed below, along with specific events of the wars, in support of the conclusions.

Innovation

One feature that stood out in recent wars was the innovations in terms of employment of weapon systems and tactics. Ukraine’s innovations that impacted the war were in drone capabilities and manufacture, tactical actions to shoot down Russian AWACS, ships, and vital assets. The Azeri military planned and executed a surprise campaign against Armenian forces, leading to their surrender. Hamas used cheap rockets to saturate Israel’s Iron Dome defensive system, and the Houthi’s used a variety of drones and missiles to disrupt shipping in the Red Sea.

All these innovative ideas proved effective and surprised the opponents. The Indian military faces peer or near-peer rivals, and any innovations that surprise the adversaries would bring in substantial leverage. The fact that the Indian military can be creative was evident in earlier wars. However, in most cases, innovations were a consequence of crisis situations. Innovations should become a habit instead of being an episodic event during crises. The Indian military needs to think through new ideas in peacetime to surprise the enemy on day one. Such innovations produce results out of proportion to the effort involved.

Collation and Analysis of Intelligence

One of the most relevant and important learnings is the need for an efficacious situational awareness system accessible to all levels of the hierarchy. Ukraine managed to set up a system that received data from a variety of own and friendly sources, such as UAVs, satellites, radars, AWACS, ELINT and then collated the data and disseminated it to appropriate users in a timely manner. Ukraine was aided in setting up such a system by many private US companies, such as Palantir, which specialize in cutting-edge technologies, AI, data analysis, and collation. The AI-enabled models presented the military at all levels with battlefield imagery and generated optimal targeting options in terms of ideal weapon platforms [iv]. Such systems provided an order-of-magnitude enhancement in effectiveness.

Such a centralized and joint data collation and disseminating system is essential to allow effective joint operations. This must obviously merit a high priority.

Air Operations

Dominating the Airspace

One of the priority missions of any air force is to establish a favourable air situation to facilitate offensive missions without undue interference. This historically validated postulate was ignored by the Russian Aerospace Forces, or VKS. This resulted in the inability of VKS to support the ground war in an effective manner, leading to a series of stalemates.

VKS outnumbered and outgunned the Ukrainian air forces but was unable to dominate the airspace. One of the reasons was a lack of focus on this role. VKS undertook counter-air strikes in the first few days but abandoned the mission when the land forces changed their attention towards capturing East Ukraine. This provided time for Ukrainian forces to recoup and reorganize [v].

Another reason was the lack of joint planning. This was evident when heliborne and airborne operations were launched on the very first day to capture Hostomel airfield and threaten Kyiv. There was no attempt to establish air superiority, a prerequisite for such operations. This resulted in some troop-carrying helicopters being shot down and the subsequent airborne operations being called off. [vi]

Another major shortcoming of VKS was its inability to undertake effective SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defences) operations. Ukraine managed to reorganize its Integrated Air Defence System inflicting heavy losses to Russian Ka-52, Mi-35, Mi-24 helicopters and CAS fighters such as the Su-25 Frogfoot[vii].

VKS tried different ways to overcome the problem such as flying at low levels to delay detection and popping up for weapon release. But this reduced the accuracy and effectiveness of VKS’s air support. Recently, the VKS innovated and converted their old stock of iron bombs into guided glide bombs released at distances of 60 to 70 km from well inside their own territory. These glide bombs proved devastating, inflicting heavy losses on Ukrainian troops and being instrumental in recent Russian gains in Avdiivka and other locations. This confirmed that effective air support helped the Russian army progress faster. Even as glide bombs devastated Ukrainian positions, their IADS used innovative tactics and managed to shoot down 10 to 12 frontline Russian fighters—Su-34s and Su-35s—in one week in 2024 [viii].

The Ukraine-Russia war brings out the need to pursue the air superiority mission in a focused manner and suppress the enemy’s GBAD systems to provide effective support to the land forces. The entire gamut of air operations should emerge from a joint plan that factors in the priorities of air and ground operations. The important takeaways in our context would be:

• IAF must prioritize the achievement of favourable air situation over the desired operational airspace, and this must form an integral part of the joint plan.

• To facilitate this, IAF requires to prioritise early induction of stealth aircraft and regularly upgrade its fighters with advanced airborne radars, BVR missiles and integral EW suites to remain ahead of the curve.

• SEAD operations must form an integral part of air operations. This would require specialized EW/ECM units in addition to integral EW suites on aircraft. Joint capabilities covering spoofing, jamming of Space Nav signals etc need to be developed.

• Capability for hard kill of enemy radars and transmitters employing drones and surface and air-launched missiles must be developed and upgraded. India already possesses such weapons.

• All air missions, whether in the interior or in the battlefield airspace, must integrate EW/ECM along with weapons to disable enemy radars. This will require detailed planning and communication between operators.

• An integrated situational awareness system becomes essential with a variety of users operating in the airspace over the battlefield.

Operations of Force Multipliers

Force multipliers such as AWACS, AEW&C, and Flight Refuellers are valuable assets for detection, support, and control of air operations. Due to their cost and complexity, they are always available in limited numbers. Their loss can impact air operations adversely. Very surprisingly, Russia lost one A-50, Beriev AWACS patrolling well inside its territory, in early 2024. This was the second A-50 lost in this war, alongside damage to an IL-22 Command Post. The losses were due to the imaginative employment of GBAD by Ukraine. [ix]

One major learning from the Ukraine war relevant in our context is the vulnerability of force multipliers such as AWACS, AEW aircraft, command posts, and strategic ISR UAVs such as Hermes and MQ 9B. These operate at medium and high altitudes and can be detected easily by enemy radars and engaged by long-range GBAD or fighters with long-range AAMs. Innovative tactics and combinations of weapon systems can destroy them, as happened to the Russian A-50s.

A combination of defensive and offensive means would be required. AWACS and strategic UAVs would be required to operate at safe distances, possibly over 200 km from the frontlines. The consequent reduction in detection or surveillance capabilities may need to be accepted and augmented through measures such as the networking of ground-based and airborne radars to create and present a comprehensive air picture. ISR capability during hostilities can be enhanced by the collation of ISR data from satellites, UAVs (strategic and tactical), and other sources and the timely dissemination of data to users.

Offensive measures would include detection of movement of long-range enemy AD radars to forward locations using ELINT and then quickly neutralize the radars by employing ECM and hard-kill options. The Indian military must in peacetime think through to evolve tactics to bring down enemy AEW/AWACS and strategic recce drones (as done recently by Houthis in the Hamas-Israel war).

Efficacy of Air Denial

The Ukrainian strategy of air denial was making a virtue out of necessity. Air denial was effective because VKS did not pursue the air superiority mission in a dedicated manner at the start of the war and thus lost the initiative. Ukraine had limited aircraft assets, and in the initial years, NATO and the USA were unwilling to provide aircraft for offensive operations. Allies were, however, forthcoming in supplying the latest GBAD systems, such as Patriot and MANPADS. Under these conditions, it was quite natural for Ukraine to adopt an air denial strategy [x]. Air denial would be the option of the weaker side, lacking the capacity to use its airpower in offensive roles. Air denial is hardly an option in the Indian context, considering that India enjoys an advantage over its adversaries in the employment of airpower.

UAV Operations

Recent wars have highlighted the centrality of drones in modern warfare. Their versatility, low cost, small size, and avoidance of human casualties make them weapons of choice. Some important takeaways from recent wars with respect to drones and their applicability in the Indian context are discussed below.

Drones for CAS. As per Oryx, in the Azerbaijan-Armenia war of 2020, Azeri drones destroyed over 101 tanks and other equipment. Similarly, in the Ukrainian-Russia war, Ukrainian drones provided fire support to troops, destroying over 2400 tanks among 15,000 other weapons systems. Russia also employed drones extensively during land battles when its helicopter and fighter losses mounted. Drones thus provided responsive support to land forces in battle. Ukrainians adapted civilian drones with armament and guidance, such as the FPV (First Person View) drones, enabling soldiers to visually guide the drones and destroy targets. The Russians employed glide bombs when the drones proved inadequate.

Crowded Airspace. It is reported that in the Ukrainian war, as many as 25 to 50 drones operated at any given time in a 10-kilometer zone at the battlefront. Avoiding interference between our own drones, counter-drone operators, and GBAD operations will not be easy. In addition, fighters and helicopters would also be operating or transiting through this crowded airspace, raising the possibility of fratricide.

Counter-Drone Operations. Counter-drone operations are maturing, employing all possible means such as AD missiles, guns, ECM, jamming, and spoofing. Overtime counter- drone operations have imposed heavy losses. Ukrainian losses touched 300 drones a day, or 10,000 drones a month. Russia suffered similar drone attrition. [xi] In comparison, Armenian AD systems shot down just a few Azeri drones. One of the reasons was that the engagement range of Armenian AD systems (except the TOR system) was less than the weapon release ranges of TB-2 drones used by the Azeris. Azerbaijan used innovative tactics to outsmart Armenian AD systems.

 Drone Operators. Considering their extensive employment, Ukraine has proposed setting up a separate Unmanned System Force [xii].

Learnings and Application in the Indian Context

In India, each service has acquired UAVs and is sponsoring private players to develop a variety of drones and countermeasures. While the Navy has a clear operating airspace, the Army and Air Force may have to share airspace over the battlefield. The experiences from the recent wars may help in resolving the problem of shared airspace where drones, attack helicopters of the Army and Air Force, and fighters would operate alongside our GBAD systems. Collating the learnings on drones in recent wars, the important takeaways are discussed below.

Reorientation of Air Support

A major reorientation of CAS operations may be feasible with the capabilities displayed by drones. The responsibility of CAS near the FLOT can be entrusted to the frontline troops equipped with suicide or FPV drones and assisted by a centralized real-time ISR feed for situational awareness and targeting. The features of such a reorientation may be as follows:

• The reorientation can be facilitated by identifying a line (Fire Control Line) possibly 20 km ahead of FLOT, up to which forward troops would be responsible for engaging enemy targets with drones under their control.

• Beyond this line, targets and their engagement would be jointly decided and allocated for engagement to fighters, attack helicopters, drones, or missiles.

• The traditional CAS missions can now be undertaken by drones under the control of forward-based troops, as is happening in Ukraine.

• For heavy bombing, fighters may be called in, as done by Russians delivering heavy-duty glide bombs.

• IAF may need to evolve tactics and equip itself to employ weapons such as glide bombs or JDAMs for targets beyond the capabilities of drones of frontline troops.

• Such reorientation and reequipping would ensure responsive air support under the control of forward troops.

• This would ease the problem of controlling air assets with only our own drones operating in the battlefield airspace.

• The Army would need to decide on levels of control of UAVs for strategic recce, tactical recce and attack functions. This may depend on drone capabilities, with forward troops controlling drones to engage targets across the battle lines, while Brigade/Division/Corps would control drones with greater payload and range.

• Such an arrangement would necessarily require real-time feed to frontline troops and intermediate formations on collated output from strategic/ tactical recce by UAVs, satellites, or aircraft.

• Such delegation of control over drones to the frontline and intermediate formations would necessitate trained manpower with formal staffing approvals.

• The Indian military would be required to set up joint training facilities for drone operators and support functions.

Counter-Drone Operations

The extensive employment of drones by adversaries in the Indian context makes the development and fielding of counter-drone systems essential. Such systems should involve both EW, ECM, and hard-kill options.

• The cheapest measures may be jamming of GPS or the adversary’s Satellite Nav System signals.

• Hard kill options must possess engagement or effectiveness ranges that extends beyond the weapon release range of known enemy drones.

• Clarity on areas of responsibility would be required. The Army should have the responsibility of counter-drone operations in the TBA, while the Air Force should be responsible for the protection of interior areas alongside the usual Air Defence responsibility.

• Fixed-wing fighters may be employed for the interception of drones that penetrate deep into Indian territory.

• Counter-drone measures and tactics must be thought through and evolved during peacetime to surprise the adversaries on day one.

• The development and fielding of counter-drone systems will necessarily involve joint training and deployment.

Drone Swarms. The Hamas-Israel war revealed how even a high-tech defensive system like Israel’s Iron Dome can be saturated, rendering it ineffective [xiii]. It also brought out that attempting to ward off attacks by cheap rockets or drones using expensive missiles may not be cost-effective. These experiences indicate that:

·          Drone swarms may be used to confuse the enemy or shield our fighters or drone attacks. Priority missions should employ drone swarms along with ECM to conceal their entry into enemy AD zones.

·          The Indian military must be prepared for an adversary employing drone swarms and counter these when required.

·          Cost-effective means such as ECM, spoofing, jamming, and AD guns must be employed for countering swarms.

Conclusions

The military trends revealed by recent and ongoing wars challenge some of the existing concepts and doctrines. The Indian military, facing live borders and aggressive adversaries, needs to analyse the learnings and adapt them to the Indian context. The main learnings that stand out are the need to institutionalize innovation and the setting up of a joint situational awareness system that collates and disseminates data and relevant battlefield imagery to operators at all levels of the hierarchy. On the operational front, learnings point towards the need for joint plans that prioritize the air superiority mission to establish a favourable air situation. This would require the fleet to be appropriately equipped for this role. Focus should also be on integrating EW and hard-kill options at the planning stages to suppress enemy’s GBAD systems. The rapidly improving UAV capabilities encompassing diverse missions point towards the need to update existing doctrines and joint planning. A need exists to reorient the CAS role to make it more responsive by giving the capability to employ armed drones to frontline troops, while the air force retains the role of heavy bombing. Counter-drone operations would need to be thought through with joint planning, training, and staffing. Timely adaptation and implementation of learnings would lead to substantial improvements in military effectiveness.

 End Notes

[i] David Vergun, Army leaders plan for uncertain future, https://www.army.mil/article/96483/army_leaders_plan_for_uncertain_future

[ii] Schelling, Thomas C. 1966. Arms and Influence. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, quoted in How Bas, M. A., and R. J. Schub, How Uncertainty About War Outcomes Affects War Onset, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2014, ttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:27115555).

[iii] Arjun Subramaniam, Airpower: A Game Changer In An India-China Limited Conflict, Ather: A Journal Of Strategic Airpower & Spacepower,  Vol. 2, No. 4, Winter 2023. Pp 55-58.

[iv] Vera Bergengruen, Time Magazine, February 8, 2024, https://time.com/6691662/ai-ukraine-war-palantir/

[v] (Jaganath Sankaran, How Ukraine Fought Against Russia’s Air War, January 2, 2023, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/how-ukraine-fought-against-russias-air-war)

[vi] Rafael Ichaso, Russian Air Force’s Performance in Ukraine, Joint Air Power Competence Centre (2020-2023), Published: February 2023, ttps://www.japcc.org/articles/russian-air-forces-performance-in-ukraine-air-operations-the-fall-of-a-myth/

[vii] Jaganath Sankaran, How Ukraine Fought Against Russia’s Air War, January 2, 2023, https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/how-ukraine-fought-against-russias-air-war

[viii] Russia Loses 12th Warplane in 12 Days, Newsweek, February 29, 2024, https://www.newsweek.com/russia-ukraine-sukhoi-34-war-plane-losses-1874591

[ix] David Axe, Incredibly, The Russian Air Force Has Lost Another Rare A-50 Radar Plane, Forbes,

ttps://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/02/23/incredibly-the-russian-air-force-has-lost-another-one-of-its-rare-a-50-radar-planes/?sh=3bcdf0572ac4)

[x] Gerry Doyle, Mariano Zafra, The Air War over Ukraine, Reuters, Dec. 14, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/FIGHTER-JETS/jnvwwqyylvw/

[xi] Vera Bergengruen, Time Magazine, February 8, 2024, https://time.com/6691662/ai-ukraine-war-palantir/

[xii] Kristen D Thompson, Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/article/how-drone-war-ukraine-transforming-conflict

[xiii] Sujan Chinoy, Tech Wars or Old Battlefields: Lessons from the Recent Conflicts, ORF, February 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/research/tech-wars-or-old-battlefields-lessons-from-the-recent-conflicts