The Art of Mind Games: Psychological Warfare    Between Nations

Published Indian Defence Review Apr-Jun 2024

A lie can travel half way around the world while truth is putting on its shoes.

Anon

Introduction

In the competitive arena of geopolitics, psychological face-offs occur more often than physical confrontations. Such encounters aim to create a competitive advantage by demoralizing or denting the confidence of opponents. At times such moves attempt to interfere with the decision-making process by persuading opponents to opt for strategies that may favour the instigator. 

Take the case of Chinese soldiers trespassing in Chumar area in September 2014 just before the Chinese President Xi Jinping’s official visit to India. Despite assurances from the Chinese President, the withdrawal of Chinese forces to their original positions was delayed. The incursion and the delayed withdrawal appeared to be a deliberate provocation putting India on the backfoot during the interaction and negotiations between the two Heads of State. There was a similar occurrence in 2013, when Chinese soldiers intruded into the Depsang bulge in April, barely a month before the visit of the Chinese Premier Li Keqiang. Both these instances were quite clearly aimed at dominating the interaction between the leaders of the two countries.

Mind Games

These one-upmanship duels are generally called Mind Games. Mind games involve deliberate actions to seek competitive advantage. This is achieved by actions or narratives that dent or lower the confidence of the opponent to enable the aggressor to look superior or derive advantage in the interactions that follow. Mind games are fascinating phenomena. They involve strategic manoeuvres and psychological moves to manipulate, deceive, and intimidate the other side. Mind games are common in all kinds of sports, both individual and team. Sledging, the term commonly heard in the game of cricket is nothing more than an attempt to erode the confidence of opponents and create self-doubt about their capabilities. It can prove highly destructive in sports. It is also common in personal and social relationships. Though common in personal and social interactions, mind games are an integral feature of politics and geopolitics.

Mind games in geopolitics arise from power struggles, where one entity attempts to gain the upper hand and control the dynamics of the relationship. Mind games may be used to display strength and superiority, lower confidence and self-esteem, or manipulate and change the behaviour of the opponent. 

Exponents of Mind Games

One of the best-known exponents of mind games is China. It has a long history of playing mind games in furtherance of its belief in Sun Tzu’s dictum, “The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.” Among the list of countries being targeted is India; which receives special attention alongside Taiwan. This may be because India is slowly emerging as a rival and competitor, opposing some of China’s pet projects and confronting PLA on the LAC.  India’s External Affairs Minister Mr S Jaishankar publicly highlighted the Chinese propensity to play mind games against India.

India has been at the receiving end of mind games played by China, Pakistan, and many other countries for quite some time.  The West plays mind games to undermine the ruling dispensation. So-called independent institutions release biased reports on religious inequality or intolerance, poor democratic credentials, and in general attempt to undermine the image of the country in the eyes of its citizens and diaspora.

Scope

India has been quite hesitant in responding in the same coin. However, with its growing self-confidence, India should now consider responding in kind to mind games being played against it, particularly by China. The discussion that follows covers some of the known mind games played by China and outlines possible options for responding similarly to Chinese mind games.

India and China’s Mind Games

Playing mind games is an art. Too much aggression in communicating the narrative or in actions may result in an open rebuttal by the target country. Too mild a communication or lack of media attention may result in the message being ignored by the opponent. The ability to convey the message in a manner that receives attention is of essence and control of media thus becomes important. China has focused on this aspect. As per the French military, “China controls more than 3,000 public television channels in the world, over 150 pay TV channels, around 2,500 radio stations, about 2,000 newspapers and 10,000 magazines and more than three million internet sites”[i]. Media outlets thus amplify Chinese narratives giving them wide coverage.

Some of the known Chinese mind games are aimed at undermining India by reminding it of the 1962 debacle and threatening to teach India a lesson unless it avoids confrontations. Chinese media showcases its military superiority by screening videos displaying the PLA might as it exercises in areas near the borders with India. These narratives are built up by state-sponsored media outlets and social media outlets conveying the superiority of the Chinese military.

Mind games were ratcheted up a notch further when India responded with a matching build-up after the Chinese intrusions in East Ladakh in 2020. Chinese expectations of a hesitant and quiet Indian response were belied as the Indian military responded vigorously, with a matching buildup. After the Galwan fisticuffs, videos were broadcast incorrectly depicting Chinese occupation of the conflict zone trying to display India’s weak withdrawal. Reminders of the 1962 defeat and videos depicting Chinese advanced tech weapons were screened regularly aiming to persuade India to back down and resume normalcy. After Indian retaliation and capture of heights on Kailash Range, there was a news item of a Chinese Professor announcing the employment of microwave weapons which supposedly burned and roasted people at the captured heights[ii]. Such narratives and videos were to undermine Indian confidence in its soldiers and in turn lower their morale.  

As the Indian military responded to the Chinese buildup there was a perception that IAF would be a major deterrent against any Chinese escalation. This was largely due to the Chinese disadvantage of operating from airfields at high altitudes in Tibet and the experience, exposure, and skill levels of Indian aviators. To counter the view a report was published in the Eurasian Times titled ‘Chinese J-20s outgun Rafales in Simulation Drills’. It quoted PLAAF claiming that ‘their fifth-generation, stealth, J-20 fighter jets shot down 17 enemy Rafales during a simulation drill’[iii]. This was quite obviously aimed at undermining IAF’s capabilities and sowing doubts in the minds of the Indian leadership.

Then there was a report in one Hong Kong English newspaper that China had withdrawn 10,000 troops from its border with India because Beijing felt that the chances of conflict were low. This withdrawal was done in trucks and in a manner that the Indian military could verify. The aim is to prod India to reduce its deployment of forces in a likewise manner and enable de-escalation without a loss of face for China.

All the above mind games are primarily aimed at trying to convey Chinese military superiority, undermining the morale and confidence of the Indian military and the leadership, and persuading India to accept Chinese hegemony in the Asian region. China seeks an upper hand in the relationship. China has been successful to some extent in precluding retaliation to its ingressions and salami slicing along the LAC. Over a period of time by 2013, China had gained control of more than 640 sq km of Indian territory in three sectors of Ladakh, without this loss of territory receiving much media publicity in India[iv]. These Chinese incursions or salami-slicing activities are primarily aimed at displaying its superiority and intimidating Indian leadership.

India’s Response to China’s Mind Games

In the last few years, one can observe a slow but certain change in India’s response to Chinese intimidation by standing up to its aggression. Indian troops have physically pushed back Chinese soldiers at many locations along the LAC. The longest such standoff was at Doklam. This was followed by the ongoing faceoff in East Ladakh. With the Indian military standing up to Chinese aggression, the stage is set for moving a step further by indicating that mind games are double-edged weapons that can be played by both sides.

Playing mind games requires subtlety. Narratives must be communicated ensuring that they cannot be attributed to the ruling dispensation. China uses Global Times or academics or defence analysts.  India must similarly cultivate Think Tanks and news and social media to initiate and amplify narratives. India reportedly has the third largest number of Think Tanks and some of these are reputed worldwide. Similarly, Indians are major contributors to social media and have been known to vigorously support narratives that further national causes. India therefore, possesses the capabilities to play mind games against adversaries. The Think Tanks or reputed analysts could start a thread that targets an opponent’s vulnerabilities. The argument can then be amplified by the news and social media In the first such venture China may be considered as the target since it continues to badger India with its games such as renaming locations in Arunachal Pradesh. The mind game narratives must target Chinese vulnerabilities and anxieties.  The Indian government has taken a step in this direction by building trade and friendly ties with Taiwan: a step that makes China go ballistic. Some other vulnerabilities or anxieties that could be played on are discussed below.

The foremost would be to dissuade incursions by the PLA across the LAC by highlighting the consequences. China is unlikely to escalate any faceoff with India into an open war. Its main interests or priorities lie elsewhere in Taiwan. It will not risk another uncertain war to its South. Chinese anxiety will be that if it is forced to withdraw or revert to the status quo it would lose face. This would dent its image of invincibility. The aim must be to remind the Chinese of the Indian Army’s capture of the Kailash Range in August 2020 right under the nose of the PLA. (This is the counter to the Chinese reminder of the Indian defeat in 1962.) The subtle message must be that the Indian Army could capture vulnerable disputed locations in response to any unwarranted or surreptitious Chinese incursions. A narrative on these lines may seed doubts in the minds of the PLA.

 Another point that suits a mind game is denting the Chinese view that its string of pearls threatens India and would induce it to submit to Chinese hegemony. In this regard, the narrative should point towards the vulnerability of Chinese bases or ports in India’s vicinity such as those in Myanmar, Sri Lanka, and other countries.  Most of these locations which may serve as Chinese military bases are within striking range of Indian airpower. If used during hostilities these become legitimate targets for Indian air attacks. In addition, these locations have very limited defence capability. Such a narrative intends to caution China, as also the home countries on avoiding military use of such facilities. The facilities then become a liability for the home country as also for China.

Lastly, there is always the Chinese Malacca vulnerability which can be highlighted subtly by suggesting the creation of air bases in the far south of the Nicobar group of islands which can threaten the shipping in and around the Malacca Straits.

Conclusion

Psychological confrontations in geopolitics occur far more often than physical ones. Such psychological duels aim to influence the behaviour of opponents through mind games.  Mind games are power struggles that attempt to gain an upper hand in a relationship by a display of superiority and manipulating the behaviour of the opponent.  India has been at the receiving end of mind games by its neighbours as well as the West. China in particular, has been playing mind games to dominate the relationship with India. It has used many stratagems to undermine India’s confidence such as intrusions across the LAC, reminding India of the 1962 debacle and other communications to accept Chinese hegemony. India in recent times is resisting such games and can add to its repertoire by being assertive. It can play mind games that target China’s vulnerabilities and anxieties.  Narratives should be initiated in a manner to ensure the government’s non-attributability. Narratives can be initiated by Think Tanks and amplified by the news and social media.  Such mind games may lead to a Chinese rethink and avoid confrontation on the LAC. These may include reminding China of its reverses in the Kailash range after the 2020 intrusions. Other anxieties would be to target Chinese bases located near India if used during hostilities and pointing out the Malacca Straits vulnerability. An assertive India should expand its options to secure its security interests by playing mind games to influence the behaviour of its adversaries.

[1] J.-B. Jeangène Vilmer, A. Escorcia, M. Guillaume, J. Herrera, Information Manipulation: A Challenge for Our Democracies, report by the Policy Planning Staff (CAPS) of the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs and the Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM) of the Ministry for the Armed Forces, Paris, August 2018, pg 59.

[1] "Fake": India On Reports That China Used "Microwave Weapons" In Ladakh

India-China Standoff: According to Indian officials, China is seeding ''fake news'' about using microwave weapons,

https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/india-on-reports-that-china-used-microwave-weapons-in-ladakh-fake-news-2326640 Conclusion

[1] Brijesh Dhar Jaya, Chinese mind games and our false sense of well-being, October 3, 2020,  Jay speak, India, TOI

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/jay-speak/chinese-mind-games-and-our-false-sense-of-well-being/

[1]   Shiv Aror, Chinese Army has occupied 640 square km in three Ladakh sectors, India Today,

New Delhi, Dec 15, 2013, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/north/story/chinese-army-occupied-640-square-km-three-ladakh-sectors-report-209992-2013-09-04

End Notes 

[i] J.-B. Jeangène Vilmer, A. Escorcia, M. Guillaume, J. Herrera, Information Manipulation: A Challenge for Our Democracies, report by the Policy Planning Staff (CAPS) of the Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs and the Institute for Strategic Research (IRSEM) of the Ministry for the Armed Forces, Paris, August 2018, pg 59.

[ii] "Fake": India On Reports That China Used "Microwave Weapons" In Ladakh

India-China Standoff: According to Indian officials, China is seeding ''fake news'' about using microwave weapons,

https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/india-on-reports-that-china-used-microwave-weapons-in-ladakh-fake-news-2326640 Conclusion

[iii] Brijesh Dhar Jaya, Chinese mind games and our false sense of well-being, October 3, 2020,  Jay speak, India, TOI

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/jay-speak/chinese-mind-games-and-our-false-sense-of-well-being/

[iv]   Shiv Aror, Chinese Army has occupied 640 square km in three Ladakh sectors, India Today,

New Delhi, Dec 15, 2013, https://www.indiatoday.in/india/north/story/chinese-army-occupied-640-square-km-three-ladakh-sectors-report-209992-2013-09-04